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ABSTRACT
The article focuses on judicial politics in three international regimes. The courts of these regimes are
trustee courts, operating in an environment of judicial supremacy with respect to states. An interna-
tional trustee court meets three criteria: (1) the court is the authoritative interpreter of the regime’s law;
(2) the court’s jurisdiction is compulsory; and (3) it is virtually impossible, in practice, for contracting
states to reverse the court’s important rulings. After developing a theory of trusteeship, we turn to how
judges have used their powers. Although there is variation, each court has engaged in “majoritarian ac-
tivism,” producing law that reﬂects standard practices or a high degree of state consensus but that
would not have been adopted by states under unanimity decision rules. Majoritarian activism helps
judges to develop the law progressively, to mitigate potential legitimacy problems, and to render efforts
at curbing the growth of their authority improbable or ineffective.
This article explores judicial politics in three regimes that have a serious claim to be con-
sidered “constitutional” in a meaningful sense: the European Convention on Human
Rights ðECHR; Greer 2006; Stone Sweet 2009bÞ, the European Union ðEU; Stein
1981;Weiler 1991Þ, and theWorld Trade Organization ðWTO; Cass 2005; Trachtman
2006Þ. In each, trustee courts govern through the production of what is, in effect, a
precedent-based jurisprudence. They perform an oracular function, giving meaning to
incomplete treaty provisions and making law in other ways. They routinely resolve dis-
putes in which core treaty values are in conﬂict, deploying balancing techniques similar
to those used by powerful national constitutional courts. And they constitute a crucial
mechanism for coordinating the regime’s law with national legal orders.
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While the appropriateness of the constitutional label remains in dispute, it is unde-
niable that each of these regimes has been heavily judicialized. The judicialization of an
international regime refers to the process through which its court accretes inﬂuence over
the treaty system’s institutional evolution. In the basic theory, judicialization is ex-
plained as a product of logics of delegation and the dynamics of judicial-political inter-
action, in particular, the feedback effects of judicial lawmaking on the decision making
of state ofﬁcials ðStone Sweet 1999Þ. In the three regimes under consideration, states
have delegated signiﬁcant “political property rights” to courts, not least in order to en-
hance compliance with the regime’s law ðMajone 2001Þ.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section I, we focus on logics of delegation, elab-
orating a theory of trusteeship from within the standard principal-agent framework. The
European Court of Human Rights ðECTHRÞ, the European Court of Justice ðECJÞ,
and the WTO Appellate Body ðWTO-ABÞ are not simple agents of contracting states
but are trustees of their respective regimes. In the international context, a trustee court
can be identiﬁed on the basis of three criteria:1 ð1Þ the court is recognized as the author-
itative interpreter of the regime’s law, which it applies to resolve disputes concerning
state compliance; ð2Þ the court’s jurisdiction, with regard to state compliance, is com-
pulsory; and ð3Þ it is virtually impossible, in practice, for contracting states to reverse the
court’s important rulings on treaty law. A trustee court is a kind of “super agent,” em-
powered to enforce the law against states themselves. States, as principals, delegated to
courts in order to help them overcome the acute commitment problems associated with
market and political integration ðEUÞ, the protection of fundamental rights ðECHRÞ,
and the liberalization of trade ðWTOÞ. In this account, courts are trustees of the values
that inhere in the treaties that constituted them, discharging various “ﬁduciary” duties
in the service of the overarching objectives of the regime.
Two points concerning the notion of trusteeship deserve emphasis in advance. First,
the concept denotes a speciﬁc institutional conﬁguration. By deﬁnition, an interna-
tional trustee court occupies a position of structural supremacy in relation to states; how
judges actually use their authority is an empirical, not a conceptual, question. Any well-
speciﬁed theory of judicial politics must include an account of the institutional founda-
tions of judicial power, which trusteeship provides in the case of these regimes. To de-
velop explanatory theory, however, the concept must be supplemented with other ideas
and variables. One major claim of the article is that, under certain conditions, trustee
courts are able to dominate the institutional evolution of their respective regimes. To
the extent that ð1Þ important disputes alleging noncompliance with treaty law are rou-
tinely brought to the court, ð2Þ the judges produce defensible rulings, and ð3Þ states
treat the reasons the court gives to justify rulings as having precedential effect, then the
1. The concept of trusteeship has been applied to courts at both the national-constitutional and
international levels; see Stone Sweet ð2002, 2004Þ and Stone Sweet and Mathews ð2008Þ.
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steady judicialization of the regime is all but inevitable. In the systems under consider-
ation, these conditions are met, and judicialization has steadily proceeded.
Second, judicial supremacy raises well-known legitimacy concerns, the source of
which is the capacity of a trustee court to generate policy outcomes that elected ofﬁcials
would not have produced on their own but are virtually impossible to reverse except
through subsequent rounds of litigation. In the United States, under the trusteeship of
the Supreme Court, the effort to counter the so-called counter-majoritarian difﬁculty
has dominated constitutional theory over many decades ðBickel 1962; Ely 1980; Kra-
mer 2004Þ. In the international realm, it is commonplace to assert that courts face more
acute legitimacy dilemmas than do national courts when they exercise judicial review of
state measures ðWalker 2008Þ. The ECTHR, the ECJ, and the WTO-AB, after all, are
regularly asked to pass judgment on the decisions of elected national ofﬁcials. In the law
of trusts, trustees are required to fulﬁll speciﬁc ﬁduciary duties, not least to allow them
to elicit and respond to the preferences of beneﬁciaries. By fulﬁlling similar obligations,
these courts have constructed deliberative practices that have served to bolster their own
political legitimacy.
Section II of the article examines how the ECTHR, the ECJ, and theWTO-AB have
resolved disputes involving derogation clauses that permit a defendant state to claim an
exemption from treaty obligations for measures that are “necessary” to achieve impor-
tant public interests. We do so in order to provide a comparable test of our claims across
the three regimes. The test is relatively robust. Derogation clauses generate the most po-
litically sensitive class of cases these courts confront, not least because the treaties them-
selves permit states to invoke them in order to shield measures under review from judi-
cial censure. Adopting a deferential posture would have stunted the development of the
legal system in that states, not the court, would determine whether treaty obligations
trumped national policy preferences.2 Instead, judges opted for an intrusive standard of
judicial review, fully exposing themselves as signiﬁcant lawmakers.
The case studies focus on how each of these courts determines whether the state acts
under review infringe more on treaty rights or entitlements than is “necessary” for the
defendant state to achieve its declared goal. We show that, within “necessity analysis,”
judges have developed techniques of assessing aggregate state practice in order to arrive
at some measure of the extent of regime consensus on a relevant policy issue; the degree
of policy consensus is then treated as an important fact bearing on the case at hand. This
practice enables judges to pursue a strategy of majoritarian activism,3 although the
WTO-AB does so less intensively than its ECJ and ECTHR counterparts. Majoritarian
activism refers to the disposition of judges to produce rulings that reﬂect outcomes that
2. Examples of adopting a deferential posture would include developing a “political questions”
doctrine, or what Americans call “rational basis” review.
3. The term was coined by Maduro ð1998Þ. To our knowledge, only Maduro and Stone Sweet
ð2010Þ have analyzed “majoritarian activism” as a phenomenon.
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states might adopt under majoritarian, but not unanimity, decision rules. The strategy
helps these courts manage judicialization, mitigate the legitimacy problems associated
with judicial lawmaking under supremacy, and render efforts at curbing the growth of
their authority improbable or ineffective.
I . TRUSTEESHIP AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Over the past three decades, the principal-agent construct has emerged as a standard ap-
proach to research on the ﬁrm ðMilgrom and Roberts 1992; Laffont and Martimort
2001Þ, state organs ðStrom, Müller, and Bergman 2006Þ, and international regimes
ðPollack 2003Þ, not least because it offers ready-made, appropriate concepts that the an-
alyst can tailor to empirical research on virtually any governance situation. The ap-
proach dramatizes the relationship between “principals” and “agents” against the back-
ground of a speciﬁed set of governance problems.4 In this section, we reference the
framework to distinguish trustee courts from simple courts-as-agents and to draw out
the consequences of trusteeship for the judicialization of international regimes.
The principals are those actors who create agents, whereupon the former confer on
the latter discretionary authority to make binding decisions. The agent governs to the
extent that her decisions inﬂuence the distribution of values and resources in the domain
of her competence. By assumption, the principals are initially in control in that they pos-
sess the authority and resources to constitute ðor not to constituteÞ the agent. Since the
principals are willing to pay the costs of delegation, it is assumed that they expect beneﬁts
to outweigh costs over time. The analyst typically “explains” the origin and persistence of
an organization, or governance situation, in light of the speciﬁc functional demands of
those who delegate ðThatcher and Stone Sweet 2002Þ. Among other reasons, principals
constitute agents in order to help them resolve commitment problems, to harness epi-
stemic expertise in the regulation of technical policy areas, and to avoid taking blame for
pursuing outcomes that will be unpopular with important actors and groups.
The capacity of principals to control agents is a central preoccupation of the ap-
proach. Whereas the legitimacy of delegated governance ﬂows from the goals of the
principals, the potential for the agent to develop her own interests—and thereby pro-
duce unforeseen and unwanted policy that is costly to eradicate—is assumed to be an
omnipresent problem. Because such “agency costs” inhere in delegation, would-be
principals face a design dilemma. In order for them to achieve their goals, they have to
grant meaningful discretionary authority to an agent, although these powers may be
used in ways that undermine the rationale for delegating in the ﬁrst place. If principals
share this anxiety, they will seek to incentivize the agent so as to limit agency costs, most
notably, through procedures that allow for oversight and override. Legislatures typically
retain the capacity to control policies produced by “independent” agencies, for example.
4. For an introductory survey of delegation theory, see Thatcher and Stone Sweet ð2002Þ.
64 | JOURNAL OF LAW AND COURTS | SPR ING 2013
This content downloaded  on Wed, 6 Mar 2013 13:11:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
In contrast, the more intensive the commitment problem faced by principals, the more
likely they are to create a trusteeship situation, that is, the more discretionary authority
they will delegate to agents, ex ante, while limiting their own capacity to overturn the
agent’s decisions, ex post.
When courts are enlisted to enforce statutes or to monitor the activities of inde-
pendent agencies, judges can be scripted as agents of their principal: the legislature.
Consider a legal system based on the rule of parliamentary sovereignty.5 In such a
regime, the judges’ task is to enforce legislation, and judicial review of statutes is
necessarily prohibited. Nonetheless, in order to enforce parliament’s law, judges need
discretion to interpret and apply it to legal disputes. Because interpretation and ap-
plication are themselves forms of lawmaking, the question of agency costs inevitably
arises: the more the law is used and litigated, the more courts will determine what the
law means, as a matter of practice. Yet, even in the face of extensive judicial lawmaking,
the principal remains in charge. Through a majority vote in parliament, lawmakers can
overturn unwanted judicial decisions by amending the statute. Thus, insofar as the
principals can identify agency “errors,” they can correct them, since the decision rule
governing override—a majority vote of the parliament—facilitates the principal’s con-
trol.6
In the principal-agent construct, the decision rules governing override are crucial.
Courts in a legislative sovereignty system are relatively simple agents of parliament be-
cause parliamentarians directly control the legal instrument—statute—that binds the
courts. In contrast, the US Supreme Court and many constitutional courts around the
world are trustees of their respective constitutions, empowered to enforce the constitu-
tional law against any contrary public act, including acts of the legislature. They do so in
the name of a ﬁctitious ðif symbolically powerfulÞ principal: the sovereign people. Leg-
islators may seek to overturn constitutional decisions they do not like or to curb a trustee
court’s powers. But to do so theymust amend the constitution, the procedures for which
are far more restrictive than those governing the revision of legislation. In many coun-
tries, amendment is a practical impossibility.
Put in strategic terms, a trustee court operates in an unusually permissive zone of dis-
cretion. The zone of discretion is determined by the sum of competences explicitly del-
egated to a court and possessed as a result of its own lawmaking, minus the sum of con-
trol instruments available for use by the principals to override the court or to curb it in
other ways ðStone Sweet 2002Þ. The courts of the ECHR, the EU, and the WTO ex-
5. The paradigmatic models are the French Second, Third, and Fourth Republics and the traditional
British system.
6. With respect to statutory interpretation, the stability of parliamentary majorities can therefore be
a crucial factor in the legislator’s relationship to the courts. For example, assume that the legislative majority
that adopted the law is no longer in place; to the extent that the new majority’s relevant policy
preferences differ from those of the past majority, parliament will be less vigilant in monitoring judicial
ﬁdelity to the legislator’s original intent, and judicial lawmaking, the analyst predicts,will be less constrained.
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ercise compulsory jurisdiction over questions concerning state noncompliance; states
are under a legal obligation to comply with their rulings; and the decision rule governing
override—unanimity—reduces the probability of reversal virtually to nil. These facts
are crucial to the claims of those who view these organs in constitutional terms ðAlter
2008b; Stone Sweet 2009aÞ.
Mapping a court’s zone of discretion will not tell us how judges will deploy their
powers. Nonetheless, we can predict that a trustee court, rather than the contracting
states, will dominate the institutional evolution of the regime insofar as three conditions
are met. First, the court must have a steady caseload. If potential litigants refuse to ac-
tivate the court, judges will accrete no inﬂuence over the evolution of the regime. Sec-
ond, the court must give reasons to justify its rulings. If it does, one output of judging
will be the production of a jurisprudence: a case law recording how the law has been
interpreted and applied. The third condition is that a minimally robust conception of
precedent must develop within the system. States must accept that legal meanings are
ðat least partlyÞ constructed through adjudication and use or refer to relevant jurispru-
dence in future litigation and policy making. To the extent that these three conditions
are met, the judicialization of the regime will proceed.
From the standpoint of agency control, several implications of trusteeship deserve
emphasis. First, the principal in international regimes is a composite, not a uniﬁed, en-
tity. The situation weakens the threat of override. A composite principal, one compris-
ing multiple states whose leadership will change periodically ðthrough elections, e.g.Þ,
may not possess stable policy preferences over time. Further, as in the WTO, states may
be competing for resources on the basis of differing preferences, thus hindering their
capacity to act in a united way. Second, a trustee court possesses the de facto power to
determine the scope of its own competences and, therefore, to expand or contract the
zone of discretion. The ECJ, for example, wrote into the Treaty of Rome the doctrines
of direct effect, supremacy, and state liability, strengthening the legal system’s capacities
to deal with state noncompliance ðdiscussed belowÞ. A third point follows: under
trusteeship, the judicial process is likely to evolve into a substitute for the regime’s leg-
islative and treaty-revision processes in domains in which the court possesses jurisdic-
tion but states have proved unable to overcome bargaining impasses. In the EU ðStone
Sweet 2010Þ and the WTO ðGoldstein and Steinberg 2009Þ, adjudication regularly
replaces interstate bargaining as a primary mechanism for rule innovation. For its part,
the ECTHR treats the convention as a “living instrument” whose contents are to be in-
terpreted dynamically, as European society evolves ðLoizidou v. Turkey, no. 15318/89,
judgment of March 23, 1995Þ. Trusteeship—structural judicial supremacy—means
that judicial lawmaking will be “sticky” and path dependent: outcomes produced will
be relatively resistant to change except through subsequent rounds of adjudication
ðStone Sweet 2004, 32–41Þ.
No important ruling on treaty interpretation by these courts has ever been overrid-
den by states through treaty revision. To the extent that override is, in practice, off the
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table, indirect controls will be ineffective.7 The usual assumption in delegation theory is
that indirect controls operate according to logics of deterrence and anticipatory reaction:
the more credible the threat of punishment, the more the agent will act as if the princi-
pal’s policy interests were its own.Other things equal, threats and decisions “not to com-
ply”with a ruling are assumed ðor hypothesized to beÞ far less effective under trusteeship
than in a simple agency relationship.We do not want to bemisunderstood on this point.
Courts have a powerful interest in eliciting compliance with their decisions, because
compliance is intimately connected to building judicial authority and the rule of law,
but not necessarily because judges fear override. Any informed observer of even themost
powerful court can point to speciﬁc rulings in which compliance considerations weighed
heavily on the outcome. Nonetheless, to make the case that noncompliance has con-
strained trustee courts, in a systematic sense, one would have to demonstrate that the
legal system’s overall capacity to deal with state noncompliance has decreased, over time,
as a result of state noncompliance with court rulings. As the case studies show, it would
be impossible to do so with respect to the ECJ, the ECTHR, or the WTO-AB.
It is important to note that the ﬁrst trustee court in global history—the ECJ—dates
only from the 1950s. As Alter ð2008a, 2012Þ has documented, compulsory jurisdiction
enabling the judicial review of state measures by international courts has since become
widespread. But there are no important examples of the steady judicialization of an in-
ternational regime in the absence of a court that enjoys trusteeship status. Instead, even
nontrustee courts of crucial signiﬁcance to international lawyers, such as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, have seen their activity and inﬂuence decline in recent decades
ðPosner 2006Þ.
Fiduciary Duties
Contemporary delegation theory, with its emphasis on principal, agents, and dilemmas
of agency control, is an adaptation of concepts of contract law to the political world.
Trusts and trustees are creatures of contract and thus belong to a related cluster of con-
cepts. By their nature, trustees possess wide discretion to manage the resources and in-
terests placed in trust for the good of beneﬁciaries. Because beneﬁciaries have virtually
no direct means of controlling the trustee’s decisions, the trustee is understood to be
bound by a set of robust obligations. The most important ﬁduciary duties—“loyalty,”
“accountability,” and “deliberative engagement”—apply to trustee courts.8
In international regimes, ﬁduciary duties are articulated through codiﬁed rules gov-
erning the court’s procedures, as well as in practices that the courts themselves have de-
7. States may therefore seek to constrain a trustee court in other ways.Disgruntled statesmay publicly
complain about the court’s “activism,” threaten budget cuts, or appoint judges thought to bemore keenly
attuned to national positions. To our knowledge, there exists no important empirical research demon-
strating that such actions have effectively constrained a trustee court in any systematic sense.
8. The most sophisticated attempt to apply a theory of ﬁduciary duties to courts is Leib, Ponet, and
Serota ð2013Þ.
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veloped in the course of performing their tasks.9 For present purposes, loyalty refers to
the court’s obligation to pursue the interests and values placed in trust by the principals
while maintaining “judicial impartiality” with respect to states ðLeib et al. 2013Þ. The
linked duties of accountability require judges to give reasons for their decisions in the
service of the rule of law. Judges ground their rulings in treaty provisions and precedent,
and they seek jurisprudential coherence by reasoning through analogy ðtreating like
cases similarlyÞ. The obligation of deliberative engagement, as Leib et al. stress, comprises
“an afﬁrmative duty to engage in dialogue with those whose interests the . . . ﬁduciary
holds in trust” ðemphasis in originalÞ, which entails “an authentic effort to uncover pref-
erences rather than a mere hypothetical projection of what beneﬁciaries might want.”
International trustee courts use dialogic materials and procedures, including written
briefs, oral arguments, and expert testimony, to gauge state preferences and the probable
effects of potential rulings.
Principals delegate to agents in order to govern more effectively; harnessing an
agent’s expertise to help them enforce law and make policy is one way to do so. When
states delegate to courts, they enlist legal expertise, which is heavily conditioned—at
least in the three regimes under consideration here—by the epistemic commitments of
lawyers concerning the appropriate exercise of discretion. Fiduciary obligations formal-
ize these commitments. Whether and how a court meets these obligations is, of course,
an empirical question.10 Nonetheless, a court that strives to fulﬁll its ﬁduciary duties will
be better able to access the legitimizing resources of a powerful elite community; a court
that fails to perform them will ﬁnd the struggle for legitimacy that much harder.
Incomplete Contracting and Proportionality
The treaty instruments that govern the ECHR, the EU, and the WTO are incomplete
contracts to the extent that rights and obligations are laid down without being fully
speciﬁed.11 Incomplete contracting facilitated interstate agreement at the bargaining
9. Each of these duties is expressed in legal instruments: the European Convention on Human
Rights, arts. 21–45, and the Rules of Court; Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union;
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the WTO
Agreement.
10. A judicial organ is a trustee if it meets the three criteria laid down in the introduction;
whether judges responsibly perform their ﬁduciary obligations is an empirical question. Alter ð2008a,
33Þ argues that a court qualiﬁes as a trustee if its members are “ð1Þ selected because of their personal
reputation or professional norms, ð2Þ given independent authority to make decisions according to their
best judgment or professional criteria, and ð3Þ empowered to act on behalf of a beneﬁciary.” The for-
mulation cannot distinguish agents from trustees, at least under the standard terms of principal-agent
theory. Many agents whose decisions can be overturned relatively easily by the latter would nonetheless
meet all three criteria. Put differently, principals may seek the services of highly reputed experts while
keeping them on a tight leash.
11. On incomplete contracting and treaty regimes, see Stone Sweet ð2004, chap. 1Þ and Cooley and
Spruyt ð2009Þ.
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stage, and it enshrined the adjudication of noncompliance cases as the basic mechanism
for completing contracts over time. The case studies in Section II analyze how the courts
have approached what are, arguably, the most important and incomplete of provisions:
the derogation clauses that permit a state to claim an exemption from treaty obligations
for measures “necessary” to achieve certain speciﬁed public interests. Each of the courts
under consideration adapted a version of proportionality analysis ðPAÞ to deal with such
claims.12
PA is a multistage, analytical procedure that courts use to evaluate the justiﬁcations
proffered by a state when it claims an exemption from treaty obligations under a dero-
gation clause. Our focus is on the so-called necessity stage, in which the court deter-
mines whether the state measure under review infringes more on treaty rights or entitle-
ments than is necessary for the defendant state to achieve its declared goal. Necessity
analysis typically entails a “least restrictive means” test ða “narrow tailoring” requirement
in American termsÞ in the context of balancing regime values against the interest being
pleaded by the defendant state. A state measure that fails to meet necessity requirements
is, under the regime’s law, a “disproportionate” exercise of discretion under the treaty,
and the defendant state loses.
The turn toward PA is important to our concerns for two linked reasons. First, PA
provides a host of strategic advantages to judges in highly politicized settings ðStone
Sweet and Mathews 2008Þ. If adjudicating derogation clauses is largely outcome inde-
terminate—cases vary on the facts, not on the law—PA provides a measure of proce-
dural determinacy, guiding how balancing, argumentation, and justiﬁcation proceed. As
important, PA gives judges ﬂexibility to tailor outcomes to the more general governance
problems arising under the regime: PA does not tell judges what weight to give factors
when they balance. Second, a court that deploys PA consistently and in good faith will
meet its ﬁduciary duties. Unlike stand-alone deference doctrines, PA is a principled
decision-making framework that serves the goal of loyalty in that it enables judges to
take into account all relevant considerations when it comes to resolving conﬂicts be-
tween regime priorities and national regulatory difference. Necessity analysis also em-
beds the reason-giving and deliberative engagement requirements in a transparent proce-
dure, the basics of which are easy to master by litigants.
I I . NONCOMPLIANCE AND MAJORITARIAN ACTIVISM
In the EU, the ECHR, and the WTO, litigating state noncompliance has generated a
steady caseload, opportunities that judges have taken to enhance the effectiveness of ad-
judication as a basic mode of lawmaking and governance. In this section, we focus on
how the courts have adjudicated noncompliance disputes in which defendant states
12. The process through which PA migrated from German public law to the EU, the ECHR, and
then the WTO is traced in Stone Sweet and Mathews ð2008Þ.
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plead exemptions provided by the treaty as a defense. We give relatively more attention
to the EU case in order to address evidence provided for the opposing view, that state
noncompliance and the threat of override have constrained a trustee court.
European Union
A striking feature of European governance over the past 50 years has been the central
role played by the ECJ, whose rulings have helped to determine the course of market
and political integration at crucial moments in the regime’s evolution.13 The court’s im-
pact is rooted in the “transformation” ðWeiler 1991Þ of the treaty system through judi-
cial rulings, which Stein ð1981Þ famously characterized as the “constitutionalization” of
the regime. This transformation proceeded with the consolidation of the “constitu-
tional” doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, ﬁrst announced by the ECJ in the
1960s ðdiscussed belowÞ. As lawyers, national judges, the EU’s legislative organs, and
national ofﬁcials worked out the implications of these and related doctrines, an expan-
sionary, quasi-federal legal system emerged ðBurley andMattli 1993; Stone Sweet 2004;
Kelemen 2010Þ.
The notion of trusteeship embodies three elements that have been crucial to the con-
stitutionalization process. First, the ECJ’s major treaty rulings are effectively insulated
from override, and no such ruling has ever been reversed. Second, member state govern-
ments ðMSGsÞ are not able to block noncompliance litigation. Under article 258 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ðTFEUÞ, the commission—
the EU’s central agency—has complete discretion to bring infringement proceedings,
also called enforcement actions, against states, which it almost always wins. Under article
267 TFEU, national judges may seek guidance from the ECJ in litigation initiated by
private parties alleging state noncompliance. National judges do so routinely, and they
routinely comply with the ECJ’s rulings.14 Third, the ECJ has exploited trusteeship to
upgrade the legal system’s capacity to deal with state noncompliance ðdiscussed belowÞ.
The ECJ has been a powerful “engine of integration” for nearly ﬁve decades, and thema-
chine is fueled, not stalled, by noncompliance ðTallberg 2002; Pollack 2003Þ.
To date, the EU is the only international regime on which scholars have designed
systematic research to assess whether judicial outcomes are constrained by the threats
of noncompliance and override. The standard method involves exploring relationships
between ð1Þ the noncompliance issues raised by national courts and the commission,
ð2Þ the legal arguments contained in amici briefs to the ECJ, and ð3Þ the substance of
the court’s decisions. MSGs ðand the commission in the context of preliminary refer-
ences from the national courtsÞ may ﬁle briefs advising the ECJ on how it should rule
on the legal questions constituting any given case; the briefs thus reveal state preferences
13. For a review of the literature on the ECJ’s impact, see Stone Sweet ð2010Þ.
14. Nyikos ð2003Þ found compliance rates well above 90%.
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in a highly formalized sense. Stein ð1981Þ developed the approach in order to assess the
inﬂuence of the ECJ’s interlocutors on 11 foundational, “constitutional” rulings. These
rulings unambiguously expanded the judiciary’s zone of discretion in Europe, creating a
decentralized system for enforcing state compliance, in effect, rewriting the Treaty of
Rome. Stein found that, in their briefs to the ECJ, no state supported the ECJ’s moves,
while each state had strongly opposed at least one of them. In contrast, the ECJ found a
dependable ally in the commission.
Consider Van Gend en Loos ðcase 26/62, 1963 ECR 1Þ, the single most important
ruling issued by the ECJ. The brieﬁng parties battled over “direct effect”: could a private
party rely on a treaty provision in a national court against a state measure? Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg had collectively raised customs duties in apparent viola-
tion of the treaty, thus harming an importer, who sued in Dutch courts. In their briefs,
Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands ðthe EU had only six members at the timeÞ
insisted that the treaty creates rights and obligation only for states, not for private
parties. In fact, they stressed, the founding states had expressly rejected giving the treaty
direct effect in national orders. Prompted by the Dutch judge of reference and urged on
by the commission, the court declared that the treaty provision in question was directly
effective, that it could be pleaded before and enforced by a Dutch judge. The plaintiff
won, and the foundations of a new legal system were recast. Neither the fact of noncom-
pliance nor an implicit threat of override constrained the ECJ. The court subsequently
extended the scope of direct effect to cover a major class of EU statutes—directives; and
the ECJ announced and developed its doctrine of “supremacy,” the rule ðalso not pro-
vided for in the Treaty of RomeÞ that in any conﬂict between an EU legal norm and a
national law or practice arising in a case before a national judge, the EU normmust pre-
vail.15 These decisions ensured a steadily increasing docket of noncompliance cases from
the national courts.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, political scientists reﬁned Stein’s method and then ap-
plied it systematically to evaluate the extent to which MSGs, through threats and other
mechanisms, constrained judicial outcomes ðMcCown 2003; Nyikos 2003; Stone
Sweet 2004; Cichowski 2007Þ. Findings were remarkably consistent across the two cat-
egories of noncompliance cases. The ECJ sided with the commission in more than 90%
of infringement proceedings across all policy domains.16 With regard to cases sent to the
ECJ by national judges, the ECJ proved to be far more responsive to the preferences of
national judges and the commission than it was to MSGs, even the most powerful; and
15. Once a European legal norm enters into force, the ECJ ruled, it “renders automatically
inapplicable any conﬂicting provision of . . . national law” ðSimmenthal, ECJ 106/77, 1978Þ, including
national constitutional rules.
16. Börzel, Hofmann, and Panke ð2012Þ report that, of the 928 art. 258 rulings rendered in the
1978–99 period, the defendant state lost in 95%.
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the system routinely generated important outcomes that MSGs had blocked or
failed to produce themselves.
In a recent paper, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla ð2008Þ purport to demonstrate that
the rulings of the ECJ are constrained, “substantively” and “systematically,” by two
threats: of noncompliance on the part of any single state and of override by states acting
collectively. We address this research here for two reasons. First, Carrubba et al. argue
that their results “have general implications for the study of judicial politics” in inter-
national regimes ð449Þ. Second, their paper is the only published piece of empirical re-
search that claims to show—rather than simply assert—that the case law of any in-
ternational trustee court has been constrained by noncompliance and the threat of
override.
Carrubba et al. ð2008Þ analyzed a data set containing coded information on every
ECJ ruling rendered during the 1986–97 period ðn 5 2,246Þ, which addressed 3,176
legal questions.17 The authors added a feature to the standard method, “weighing” the
briefed positions of MSGs in proportion to the number of votes assigned to each in
the Council of Ministers ðthe EU’s legislative organ comprising MSGsÞ under qualiﬁed
majority voting rules.18 They could then derive a “net weighted position,” either posi-
tive ðbriefs sum up to support the plaintiffÞ, negative ðthe MSGs oppose the plaintiffÞ,
or zero ðno MSG ﬁled a brief or the briefs cancel one another outÞ. The design is well
suited to measuring the extent to which ECJ’s rulings align with, or depart from, the
preferences of the brieﬁng parties.
Carrubba et al. ð2008Þ cast the ECJ as a simple agent of MSGs whose rulings will
follow from MSG preferences, as briefed. The ECJ will be loath to punish a state for
noncompliance unless MSGs side against the defendant state. “If governments have the
ability to ignore adverse rulings,” they declare, “the court can only expect compliance
with its rulings when nonlitigating governments are willing to punish the defecting gov-
ernment for noncompliance” ð439Þ. Moreover, the threat of override is posed whenever
the ECJ decides a question contrary to a net weighted position taken by theMSGs. Car-
rubba et al.’s major claims are based on one statistically signiﬁcant result: when the
MSGs registered a net weighted position on a legal question, the ECJ was likely to rule
in congruence with that weighting.
However, Carrubba et al. do not demonstrate that the threats of noncompliance and
override produced the result. Indeed, they chose not to report the basic statistics that
17. In addition to ECJ rulings rendered pursuant to art. 258 TFEU ðinfringement proceedings
brought by the commissionÞ and art. 267 TFEU ðpreliminary references from national courtsÞ,
Carrubba et al. also included data from art. 263 annulment actions. Annulment actions can be
brought only against EU organs, states can never be defendants, and state noncompliance can never be
an issue. The data set contains 593 art. 263 rulings and 662 legal questions, on which MSGs ﬁled
observations in only 8.8% ð58/662Þ.
18. These rules governed the adoption of the majority of EU statutes deemed necessary to complete
the Common Market, pursuant to the Single European Act, which entered into force July 1, 1987.
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would enable assessment of their claims. We therefore collected and analyzed this infor-
mation from the cases listed in their data set and summarize our three most important
ﬁndings here.19
First, our analysis of the same rulings provides no evidence that noncompliance con-
strains outcomes. During the period in question, noncompliance cases exploded.20 The
data base contains 444 rulings pursuant to article 258 enforcement proceedings, suits
brought by the commission against states for noncompliance. Despite the fact that
MSGs registered a net weighted position in favor of the commission in only 14 cases
ð3.2%Þ, the ECJ ruled against defendant states in over 90% of its rulings. Twelve rulings
in the data set involve suits brought for failure of a state to comply with a prior article
258 ruling, the defendant state losing each. State noncompliance activates, rather than
paralyzes, the ECJ. Contrary to Carrubba et al.’s assertions, the ECJ does not need prior
authorization from MSGs to punish states for noncompliance.
Second, the threat of override cannot constrain the ECJ because it is not a credible
threat. In our analysis, we found that the override rule was unanimity in more than 90%
of the cases in the data base ðwhereas Carrubba et al. ½2008, 448 proceeded on the as-
sumption that the override rule was a qualiﬁed majority vote for all casesÞ. Figure 1 de-
picts the distribution of values on the independent variable for Carrubba et al.’s data set
as a whole, information that they did not report. On more than two-thirds of the issues
coded, MSGs took no position. On 11.8% of the questions ð375/3,176Þ, the authors
code the member states as having registered a position in favor of the plaintiff, the mean
score of which is 14.4%, slightly more than the vote of a single large state ðe.g., France or
Germany, which are coded with a 14% weightÞ. On 20% of the questions in the data
set, MSGs registered a position opposing the plaintiff ðfavoring the defendant stateÞ, the
mean score of which is 15.1%, far short of the combined votes of any two important
states. As ﬁgure 1 shows, states do not come close to reaching a qualiﬁedmajority ðabout
70% of total weighted votesÞ let alone unanimity in any systematic way. Carrubba et al.’s
claim that the threat of override has somehow constrained the ECJ—systematically—is
thus inexplicable.
Third, the evidence refutes Carrubba et al.’s assertion that the ECJ takes its cues from
MSG briefs but sides with the commission only “on the margin” ð2008, 432Þ. We have
already seen that the commission wins more than 90% of the noncompliance suits
brought against states under article 258.What about rulings pursuant to article 267 ref-
erences sent by national courts? Of the 2,048 questions raised in these references, the
commission ﬁled observations in 77.7% ðn 5 1,588Þ, whereas MSGs produced a
19. Carrubba et al. declined to provide us with the raw data underlying their models. For a more
extensive critique, see Stone Sweet and Brunell ð2012Þ.
20. In the 1987–97 period, national judges referred 2,083 ðart. 267Þ references to the ECJ, and the
commission brought 1,105 ðart. 258Þ noncompliance suits against states. In the previous decade
ð1977–86Þ, the ECJ registered 820 ðart. 267Þ references and 454 ðart. 258Þ infringement proceedings.
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weighted position in 45.2% ðn5 926Þ. When the commission takes the plaintiff ’s side
ðn 5 841Þ, the ECJ rules in favor of the plaintiff 79.9% of the time, compared to the
MSGs’ lower 70.8% success rate in far fewer cases ðn 5 342Þ. When the commission
ﬁles observations against the plaintiff ðn5 747Þ—in favor of the defendant state—the
ECJ rules in favor of the defendant state 77.7% of the time, compared to the MSGs’ far
lower 57.2% success rate ðn 5 584Þ. Note that the MSGs’ success rate is higher when
they encourage the ECJ ðto punish noncomplianceÞ than when they attempt to con-
strain the court ðfrom ﬁnding against a defendant stateÞ, though MSGs participate in
the latter activity more than in the former, a result that casts further doubt on Carrubba
et al.’s claims. The commission’s success rate, in contrast, varies hardly at all, regardless of
which side it supports.
The crucial test is the following: what happens when the commission opposes the net
weighted positions taken by the MSGs? If Carrubba et al. are right, then the commis-
sion will be relatively ineffectual when it opposes MSGs. There are 96 legal questions in
the data set on which the commission supported the defendant and MSGs took a
weighted position supporting the plaintiff; in these, the ECJ favored theMSGs’ position
in only 36.5% ðn5 35Þ of these cases. There are 234 legal questions in which the com-
mission ﬁled an observation in favor of the plaintiff and MSGs took a net weighted
Figure 1. Distribution of net weighted positions taken by the member states on legal
questions in the Carrubba et al. data set. The graph depicts the distribution of the major
independent variable in their study: the normalized net weighted positions taken by the
member states in briefs to the ECJ on legal questions in the data set. Source of the data:
Carrubba et al. ð2008Þ.
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position supporting the defendant. On 70.1% of these issues ðn 5 164Þ, the court
agreed with the commission, ﬁnding for the plaintiff. Thus, when MSGs oppose the
commission ðn 5 330Þ, the commission prevails more than two-thirds of the time. If
the commission’s position represents a majoritarian position, then the ECJ’s posture is
majoritarian.
Our ﬁndings ﬁt comfortably the notion of trusteeship developed here but are in ten-
sion with a model of the system that scripts the ECJ as a simple agent. The ECJ is a
trustee of the interests placed in trust by states for the beneﬁt not just of governments
but also of every subject of EU law.
We now turn to the politics of majoritarian activism in two policy domains: free
movement of goods and sex equality. The ﬁrst involves the adjudication of article 34
TFEU. No other treaty provision has been more important to market integration and
to deﬁning the relationship between the scope of EU authority and national regulatory
autonomy. Article 34 prohibits non–tariff barriers,21 although it is famously tempered
by an escape hatch—article 36—which permits states to derogate from article 34 on
diverse grounds.22 The treaty also obligated states to eliminate barriers to intra-EU trade
by the end of 1969 and to legislate EUmarket regulations in a timely fashion. The states
missed the deadline. In the 1970s, with two seminal decisions, the ECJ gave extensive
reach to article 34, encompassing virtually all national market regulations, while devel-
oping PA as a method of assessing state claims to derogations.23 Activated by traders, the
legal system steadily dismantled non–tariff barriers, helped to revitalize the commis-
sion’s harmonization efforts, and provoked a process that culminated in the Single Eu-
ropean Act of 1986 ðStone Sweet 2004, chap. 3Þ.
Maduro ð1998, 72–78Þ examined every ruling in which the ECJ assessed the pro-
portionality of derogations of noncompliance claims under the framework of articles
34 and 36. Judges, he found, engaged systematically in majoritarian activism within the
necessity stage. Once the ECJ had determined that the national measure in question was
more unlike than akin to equivalent measures in place in a majority of states, the ECJ
would strike it down as a violation of article 34. ðOn its own initiative, the ECJ had
begun, in the early 1980s, to ask the commission to provide such information.Þ Strik-
ingly, he found no exception to this rule. In contrast, the court tended to uphold national
measures in areas where no dominant type of regulation existed.
21. Article 34 TFEU: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent ef-
fect shall be prohibited between member-states.”
22. Including public morality, public policy, security, health, and cultural heritage, although dero-
gations may not “constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade be-
tween Member States.” In its jurisprudence on these provisions, the court would later add additional
headings, under art. 34 itself, including “ﬁscal supervision,” the “protection of public health,” the
“fairness of commercial transactions,” and the “defense of the consumer.”
23. The two decisions are Dassonville, case 8/74, 1974 ECR 837, and Cassis de Dijon, case 120/78,
1979 ECR 649.
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A second form of majoritarian activism concerns the role the ECJ has played in EU
legislative processes. In several policy domains, the court has enacted, through judicial
decision, legislation supported by a majority of MSGs in the Council of Ministers, but
blocked by a minority of MSGs, under unanimity procedures. A well-documented ex-
ample involves the effort to combat sex discrimination in the workplace. In a series of
controversial rulings—all of which are contained in the Carrubba et al. data set—the
ECJ aggressively enacted core provisions of EU legislation that had been vetoed by
France and the United Kingdom, after having been proposed by the commission ðStone
Sweet 2004, chap. 4Þ. During the 1986–93 period, the court extended article 157
TFEU, guaranteeing equal pay for equal work among men and women, to workplace
policies and beneﬁts that, although gender neutral on their face, disproportionately af-
fected women compared to men. The rulings broke the impasse, and the MSG codiﬁed
the main elements of this jurisprudence in a 1997 statute ðdirective on indirect discrim-
ination and burden of proofÞ.24 In 1990, the ECJ extended the equal treatment princi-
ple to employer-provided occupational pension schemes, case law that was ratiﬁed in the
1997 directive on occupation social security. Similarly, the court’s 1990 moves to pro-
hibit pregnancy discrimination and to require states to provide maternity leave provided
the template for a 1992 statute. In these sensitive areas, and many others, the ECJ ex-
tended the rights of individuals, under EU law, to policy domains that states had pre-
viously assumed fell within ﬁelds of national competence. Pervasive judicialization of
EU policy making has been the result ðKelemen 2010; Stone Sweet 2010Þ.
The Carrubba et al. data set also contains a set of landmark constitutional rulings
ranking in signiﬁcance with those analyzed by Stein ð1981Þ in that they signiﬁcantly
expanded the courts’ competences. In 1991, the ECJ announced the doctrine of state
liability, holding that national courts were under a duty to order a state to pay compen-
sation to private parties harmed by the state’s compliance failures ðFrancovich, case C-6
and 9/90, 1991 ECR I-5357Þ. Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom ﬁled briefs,
supported by Germany in oral argument, arguing that, since the treaty was silent on
these issues, state liability should be provided for only through EU legislation. Siding
with the commission, the ECJ rejected these arguments, bluntly stating that the doc-
trine of state liability would further enhance the effectiveness of EU law within national
legal orders. As subsequently extended in 1996, individuals and ﬁrms are entitled to rep-
aration when noncompliance involves EU law that is “intended to confer rights upon
½individuals, the breach is sufﬁciently serious, and there is a direct causal link between
the breach and the damage sustained” ðBrasserie du Pecheur, case C-46/93 and C-48/93,
1996 ECR I-1029Þ. In this case, the ECJ responded to France, Germany, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom, which argued that the treaty could not provide a remedy that is
nonexistent in national law. The ECJ dismissed the objection in terms that echo our
24. The ECJ developed a version of necessity analysis to adjudicate claims of indirect sex discrimi-
nation, which has since become a general framework for dealing with EU discrimination law.
76 | JOURNAL OF LAW AND COURTS | SPR ING 2013
This content downloaded  on Wed, 6 Mar 2013 13:11:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
discussion of trusteeship: “TheGermanGovernment . . . submits that ½for state liability
to be recognized by judicial decision would be incompatible with the allocation of
powers as between the ½ECJ and the Member States. . . . It must, however, be stressed
that the existence and extent of state liability . . . are questions of Treaty interpretation
which fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Since the Treaty contains no provision
expressly and speciﬁcally governing the consequences of breaches of ½EU Law by
Member States, it is for the Court . . . to rule . . . in accordance with generally accepted
methods of interpretation.” As the episode makes clear, even the most powerful states
have failed to constrain judges from building the capacity of the legal system to punish
states for compliance failures.
The European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR, the centerpiece of the Council of Europe, is a pan-European regime that
today covers 47 states with a population exceeding 800 million people. The legal system
was transformed by Protocol no. 11, which entered into force on November 1, 1998.
Protocol no. 11 conferred upon the court compulsory jurisdiction over individual “ap-
plications” claiming a violation of convention rights, once national remedies have been
exhausted. In the 1980s, when states could still opt out of compulsory jurisdiction, the
regime received 455 petitions; and the court, in its ﬁrst four decades ð1959–98Þ, had
rendered a total of 837 judgments. Under Protocol no. 11, activity exploded. In
1999, the court received 8,400 complaints, a ﬁgure increasing to 61,300 in 2010. In
1999, the ECTHR rendered 250 judgments, 1,200 in 2005, and 1,607 in 2010.25 To-
day, the ECTHR is the most active and important rights-protecting court in the world.
Why did states enhance the court’s authority? Two factors are crucial. First, after
World War II, Western Europe emerged as the epicenter of a “new constitutionalism”
that, with successive waves of democratization, spread across the continent. Legislative
sovereignty was overthrown and replaced by a model of constitutionalism with judicial
mechanisms for rights protection at its core. The ECHR helped to ground the diffusion
of this model while providing a transnational layer to rights constitutionalism. Second,
the Soviet bloc collapsed. In the 1990s, a decade of massive constitutional reconstruc-
tion, the EU and the Council of Europe offered membership to post-Communist states
on conditions that included a commitment to rights protection. Placing them under the
supervision of the ECTHR was a means of securing that commitment. The convention
has in fact played a crucial role in democratic transitions in post-Communist Europe:
most of these states modeled their new bills of rights on the ECHR, and many even
signed it prior to ratifying new constitutions.26 From the perspective of Western states,
Protocol no. 11 remade the regime into an efﬁcient mechanism for monitoring domes-
tic politics in regions that could pose serious threats to peace and stability on the con-
25. Statistics compiled by the authors from the ECHR website: http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/.
26. Including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
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tinent. The cost toWestern states was stronger supervision of their own systems of rights
protection.
The ECTHR performs three governance functions. It renders justice to individual
applicants beyond the state ða justice functionÞ; it supervises the rights-regarding activ-
ities of all national ofﬁcials, including judges ða monitoring functionÞ; and it determines
the content of convention rights ða lawmaking functionÞ. Protocol no. 11 fully exposed
all state organs to the supervisory machinery of the ECHR, but it did not transfer sov-
ereignty to the court. On paper, the ECTHR’s powers remain tailored to rendering jus-
tice to individual claimants. If the court ﬁnds that a state has violated an individual’s
convention rights, it may award that victim monetary damages. Unlike a national con-
stitutional court, the court has no authority to invalidate national law that conﬂicts with
the ECHR. Nonetheless, the ECTHR confronts cases that would be classiﬁed, in the
national context, as inherently “constitutional.” It resolves tensions between rights and
state interests through balancing, using PA; it has steadily raised standards with regard to
every convention right; it has long held that its precedents bind all judges in the sys-
tem;27 and it routinely indicates how a state must reform its law in order to avoid future
violations. For these reasons, the ECTHR can be considered a specialized, transnational,
constitutional court ðSadursky 2009Þ.
In the ECHR ðas in all national constitutions adopted in Europe since the end of
World War IIÞ, important fundamental rights are “qualiﬁed” by limitation clauses.
States may limit the enjoyment of rights associated with privacy and family life ðart. 8Þ,
conscience and religion ðart. 9Þ, expression ðart. 10Þ, and assembly and association
ðart. 11Þ when “necessary” to achieve certain purposes. In the standard formula, states
may “interfere with” or “restrict” the “exercise” of a convention right, but only when
such interferences are “prescribed by law” and “are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public safety for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.” As in the EU and the WTO, the ECTHR deploys PA to test “necessity.”
The ECTHR typically uses necessity analysis to determine how much discretion—
the size of the “margin of appreciation”—states possess when they act under limitation
clauses. If the court ﬁnds that a state measure under review is “necessary” to achieve its
goals under one of the headings, the state will maintain its regulatory autonomy. If the
court ﬁnds that a national law or other general measure is the source of a violation, then
the state will be subject to repetitive petitions and ﬁndings of violation until it changes
its law. A strategy of majoritarian activism animates the politics of necessity analysis. The
court raises the standard of protection in a given domain when a sufﬁcient number of
states have withdrawn public interest justiﬁcations for restricting the right. Put differ-
ently, the margin of appreciation shrinks as consensus on higher standards emerges. The
27. Many states, including Belgium, Croatia, the European Union, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, have accepted the erga omnes effects of the court’s precedents.
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move will always put some states out of compliance. Yet the court and its supporters can
claim that majoritarian activism constitutes an external, “objective” means of determin-
ing the weights to be given to the legal interests in tension, leaving the losing state to
defend a lower standard of rights protection on seemingly idiosyncratic grounds. Al-
though states may balk when it comes to implementing controversial judgments, they
eventually comply in the vast majority of cases.
In order to assess how the court determines if a new consensus among states has
emerged, we examined rulings rendered between January 1, 1999, and January 28,
2010, focusing on individual petitions pleading a right contained in articles 8–11 ðsee ta-
ble 1Þ. Cases are decided at ﬁrst instance by a seven-member section, whose rulings can be
appealed by a defendant state to a 17-member “GrandChamber”; a sectionmay also refer
the case directly to the Grand Chamber without ruling on the merits. The activities of
Grand Chambers deserve particular attention since their judgments are both ﬁnal and
capable of authoritatively establishing and overruling precedent. Since the entry into
force of Protocol no. 11, Grand Chambers have issued 246 rulings on the merits, ﬁnd-
ing violations in 179 cases ð73%Þ. Individuals pleaded one or more rights contained in
articles 8–11 in 91 of these rulings, 54 ð59%Þ of which found violations.
In 26 ð29%Þ of the 91 cases involving articles 8–11, Grand Chambers used one or
more techniques of gauging state consensus within necessity analysis. In these cases, the
crucial moment occurs when the court assesses the level of state consensus. Cases are
won or lost, and precedents are reassessed, at this point in the ruling. As a result, peti-
tioners, the defendant state, and third parties ðnongovernmental organizations and states
ﬁling as amiciÞ collect and report evidence of state practice to the court, and the court
often undertakes its own investigations. This evidence can take the form of ð1Þ a count
of states that restrict ðor no longer limitÞ a right in a particular way, through a survey of
relevant national legislation, case law, and administrative practice; ð2Þ EU law and
Council of Europe positions, as evidence of European consensus; and ð3Þ international
conventions to which states are parties. The ECTHR may also treat as pertinent to the
analysis the rulings outside the regime, such as Canada and South Africa, and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. The court often blends evidence from these various
sources to arrive at a conclusion. It is important to stress that sections process the vast
bulk of these cases, and they too routinely engage in “consensus analysis” when evalu-
ating the “necessity” of state measures.
To illustrate, consider the response to discrimination against homosexuals. In the
1980s, the court found that laws criminalizing homosexual acts violated article 8
ðprivacy; Norris v. Ireland, no. 10581/83, judgment of October 26, 1988Þ, decisions
that opened the door to the review of all national law that denied homosexuals equal
rights. The court has taken a majoritarian stance, steadily raising protection in this ﬁeld,
as social mores have evolved. In 1999, a section held that the United Kingdom’s prohi-
bition against gays and lesbians serving in the military violated article 8 ðSmith and
Grady v. the UK, no. 33985/96 and no. 33986/96, judgment of September 27, 1999Þ;
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the judges rejected the claim that the ban was necessary to preserve morale in the armed
forces, stressing that the United Kingdom’s position was a distinctly minoritarian one.
The United Kingdom, after further inquiry, rescinded the ban. In 2010, a section found
a violation of articles 11 ðassemblyÞ, 13 ðaccess to justiceÞ, and 14 ðnondiscriminationÞ
in three cases involving the recurrent refusal of Russian authorities to permit “gay
pride” parades ðAlekseyez v. Russia, no. 4916/07, no. 25924/08, and no. 14599/09;
judgment of October 21, 2010Þ. Russia claimed a wide “margin of appreciation” when
“homosexual behavior” spilled from the private into the public domain, which the sec-
tion rejected on the grounds of solid state consensus to the contrary. In 2008, a Grand
Chamber held that France could not withhold authorization from a lesbian woman at-
tempting to adopt a child, although the judges could count only 10 states permitting the
practice.28 Since the Grand Chamber stressed that the French Council of State had
partly based its decision on the fact of the woman’s homosexuality, the ruling could be
considered to be an application of existing consensus and settled case law. In any event,
the oracular nature of the ruling was obvious, and France soon changed its law.
Majoritarian activism also applies to negative cases. If the court ﬁnds that state con-
sensus on extending the scope of rights protection has not emerged or has not yet been
consolidated, it will balk at extending the scope of a right. In a 2010 case, for example, a
Grand Chamber decided an article 8 case involving same-sex marriage in these terms:
“The Court ½ﬁnds that there is an emerging European consensus towards legal recogni-
tion of same-sex couples. Moreover, this tendency has developed rapidly over the past
28. The decision raises an important point: judges can claim to have found more ðor lessÞ consensus
than may exist. Further, although the court consistently uses consensus analysis, it does not always do
so in a consistent way. As with the ECJ, the ECTHR has signiﬁcant discretion in how it proceeds and
represents its ﬁndings.
Table 1. Grand Chamber Rulings on Rights Pleaded under Articles 8–11 ECHR
Consensus Analysis
Right Pleaded Rulings Violations Violations Nonviolations
Art. 8 40 22 7 10*
Art. 9 6 4 1 2
Art. 10 35 23 0 2
Art. 11 10 5 2 1
Total 91 54 11 15
Note.—The data set includes every Grand Chamber ruling issued between January 1, 1999, and February 5,
2012 ðn 5 271Þ. The Grand Chamber has rendered ﬁnal rulings on the merits in 246 cases, in 179 of which the
Grand Chamber found violations of at least one right pleaded by an individual. Table 2 provides information on
Grand Chamber rulings in cases in which arts. 8–11 were pleaded by the applicant. “Violations” is the number of
judgments in which the Grand Chamber found a violation of in all cases and in cases in which consensus analysis
was used.
* Includes six cases on similar facts decided by the court on the basis of the same reasons given.
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decade. Nevertheless, there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition
of same-sex couples. The area in questionmust therefore still be regarded as one of evolv-
ing rights with no established consensus. ½Thus States . . . enjoy a margin of apprecia-
tion in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes” ðSchalk and Kopf v. Austria,
no. 30141/04, judgment of June 24, 2010Þ. The ﬁnding of nonviolation indicates
that laggard states will not be able to maintain the status quo. In 2011, the court rejected
a challenge to Austria’s ban on in vitro fertilization using donated genetic material. A
section declared that “there is now a clear trend in the legislation of the Contracting
States towards allowing gamete donation for the purpose of in vitro fertilisation, which
reﬂects an emerging, but not yet consolidated, ‘consensus’ ” ðS.H. and Others v. Austria,
57813/00, judgment of November 3, 2011Þ. In these and many other rulings, states
may have survived a challenge, but they have been put on notice that change is coming.
In sum, majoritarian activism, staged within necessity analysis, often determines
how convention rights will evolve. The court treats rights as substantively and tempo-
rally incomplete norms to be constructed dynamically as social mores evolve. Although
the court regularly overturns precedent to raise standards of rights protection under the
convention, the court has never reversed a precedent in order to reduce the level of pro-
tection. Once national regulatory autonomy has been lost in a given ﬁeld, states have
never regained it.29 To date, no ECTHR ruling has ever been overridden.
The World Trade Organization
The WTO, created by the Uruguay round agreements that entered into force on Jan-
uary 1, 1995, absorbed or replaced features of a dispute resolution system that had
evolved under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ðGATTÞ. The regime’s
purpose is to facilitate the expansion of international commerce through legislating and
enforcing multilateral trade law. Although the original GATT did not provide for a
court, third-party dispute resolution nonetheless emerged in the form of the panel sys-
tem. The panels acquired their authority through the ad hoc consent of two disputing
states. In the 1970s and 1980s, the system underwent a process of judicialization ðStone
Sweet 1997Þ, which helped to generate the conditions necessary for the establishment of
a system of adjudication on the basis of compulsory jurisdiction. The panel system was,
in part, retained, but its work is supervised by a high appellate organ, the AB.
The AB is a trustee court. The treaty instruments constituting the regime’s law can
be revised only by unanimous vote of its present 153 members. The “negative consen-
sus” rule governs override: a move to block a ruling of the AB can succeed only if it is
unopposed by any member; that is, the winning party to a dispute can block override.
The AB largely determines its own lawmaking capacities, and no AB ruling has ever
been overturned. As Steinberg ð2004, 249Þ puts it, given “weak constitutional con-
29. We are grateful to Bilyana Petkova for her research on this point.
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straints,” the AB has inherent capacity “to engage in expansive lawmaking.”The AB au-
thoritatively interprets WTO agreements and ensures that panels apply its jurispru-
dence in a consistent manner, a task it performs through de facto adherence to precedent.
WTO agreements are incomplete contracts that, in practice, are completed through
adjudicating state disagreements over treaty interpretation ðGoldstein and Steinberg
2009; Shaffer and Trachtman 2011Þ. Owing to the decision rule ðconsensusÞ governing
treaty making, WTO law tends to be both incomplete and rigid. States left key provi-
sions of agreements vague, not least to secure consensus, but such law is virtually im-
mune to change except through litigation ðShaffer andTrachtman 2011, 19Þ. As a result,
“judicial action” routinely becomes “a substitute for legislative action” ðGoldstein and
Steinberg 2009, 274; Shaffer and Trachtman 2011, 25Þ. Like the ECJ and the ECTHR,
the AB has not adopted a formal posture of deference when it comes to positions taken
by defendant states. Instead, the AB has pursued trade liberalization—the values en-
shrined in treaty instruments—while clarifying and progressively constructing the re-
gime’s law. To date, the AB has produced 106 reports. In 94 rulings ð88.7%Þ, the AB
held that the defendant state had failed tomeet its obligations underWTOagreements.30
Decision rules based on consensus ðunanimityÞ are also implicated in theWTO’s fail-
ure to produce common market regulations. By default, litigating article XX ðGATTÞ
was long the principal means of testing the limits of state competences to deal with nega-
tive externalities of trade, and other policy problems, unilaterally.31 Article XX contains
a list of “General Exceptions” to the GATT ðthe equivalent provision in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] is art. XVÞ. Measures that come under one of
the headings listed in article XX and meet the conditions that have been developed by
panels and the AB are permitted. Permissible exceptions include measures “necessary”
to protect public morals, intellectual property, and the life and health of humans, ani-
mals, and plants; to secure compliance with customs rules; to prevent “deceptive prac-
tices” in the marketplace; and to conserve “exhaustible natural resources.”Article XX is a
paradigmatic example of an incomplete norm of crucial signiﬁcance. Its “open language”
constitutes an “implicit delegation” of authority to judges ðShaffer and Trachtman 2011,
11Þ, made explicit by ongoing litigation.
PA, which ﬁrst emerged in a pre-WTO dispute, was immediately adopted and re-
ﬁned byWTO judges.32 The leading AB ruling is Korea—Beef, which laid down general
30. Data compiled from WTO ð2010Þ and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab
_reports_e.htm.
31. Although we limit our analysis here to art. XX GATT and art. XV GATS, many of the issues
raised in the analysis are also relevant to the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, agreements that entered into force in 1995 with
the WTO and were meant, in part, to cover gaps in art. XX GATT. See Shaffer ð2008Þ.
32. GATT panel report: U.S.—Sec. 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, November 7, 1989. For a more
complete treatment of how PA is used in the WTO, see Andenas and Zleptnig ð2007Þ and Stone
Sweet and Mathews ð2008Þ.
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guidelines for necessity analysis ðWTO-AB report, Korea—Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R
½2001Þ. The AB stressed that determining necessity proceeds on a case-by-case basis
through a “process of weighing and balancing a series of factors,” including “the extent
to which the measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued”; “the impor-
tance of the common interests or values protected” by the measure; and the impact of
the measure on trade ðpara. 164Þ. Further, the defendant state is likely to lose if a less
trade restrictive, or more GATT consistent, measure exists. As in the EU, the evaluation
of less restrictive alternatives is conditioned by a constraint, which has gradually con-
gealed as an unwritten ﬁduciary duty. To reject an article XX defense, judges must iden-
tify speciﬁc policy alternatives that were “reasonably available” to the defendant state,
and litigating states are thus led to identify alternatives as well.33
Do WTO judges engage in majoritarian activism when they undertake necessity
analysis? To address the question, we examined every panel and AB report issued in lit-
igation in which the defendant state pleaded article XXGATT ðn5 21Þ or article XVof
the GATS ðn5 1Þ. In all but two of these cases, the defendant state’s derogation claim
was rejected ðWTO-AB, U.S.—Shrimp ½I , WT/DS58/AB/R ½1998; EC—Asbestos,
WT/DS135/AB/R ½2001Þ. Unlike the ECJ and the ECTHR,WTO judges do not rou-
tinely count states. They do seek to identify consensus on relevant law and practice,
which they then treat as facts that bear on necessity analysis. In most cases, this evidence
helps to determine the outcome.
Table 2 summarizes our ﬁndings. First, WTO courts may reference established in-
dustry standards and state practices that point to available measures that are less trade
restrictive than the measure under review. If a “usual,” “normal,” or “commonly used”
technique or practice would entail measures that are more GATT consistent, then
the defendant state loses.34 Plaintiff states help the judges identify such practices. In
EC—Trademarks, for example, the United States proposed a less onerous alternative
to an administrative procedure under review, noting that “many other WTO Mem-
bers employ ½the alternative procedure,” and “it is not disputed that ½the alternative
would be WTO-consistent” ðpanel report, EC—Trademarks, WT/DS174/R ½2005,
para. 7.301Þ. Similarly, judges may refer to relevant measures of speciﬁc third-party
states to help them determine if a particular measure is in fact “necessary” to achieve
a particular purpose. A defendant states may also bring a count of states to the judges’
attention. In EC—Asbestos, the EC defended its ban on imports of asbestos-based build-
ing materials, showing that “many other Members of the WTO” had taken similar
33. The AB later formalized the obligation: “It rests upon the complaining Member to identify
possible alternatives to the measure at issue that the responding Member could have taken” ðWTO-AB,
Brazil—Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R ½2007, para. 155Þ.
34. Panel report, U.S.—Gasoline, WT/DS2/R ð1996Þ, para. 6.26; panel report, Canada—Periodi-
cals, WT/DS31/R ð1997Þ, para. 3.14; WTO-AB, Dominican Republic—Cigarettes, WT/302/AB/R
ð2005Þ, para. 51. A further example is WTO-AB,China—Auto Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R,WT/DS340/
AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R ð2008Þ.
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measures, and referencing the positions taken by the World Health Organization and
the International Labor Organization. The panel found these facts to be sufﬁcient to
accept the EC’s article XX plea ðpanel report, WT/DS/135/R, EC—Asbestos ½2000,
paras. 3.505, 3.517, and 8.231Þ.
As in EC—Asbestos, multilateral treaties and the positions taken by international or-
ganizations can serve as indicators of wider state consensus, as well as sources of law
binding the defendant state.35 InU.S.—Shrimp I ð1998Þ, the AB analyzed relevant mul-
tilateral treaties at length, in particular, the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species.
Protecting sea turtles, the AB noted, is a legal objective “shared by all participants and
third participants in this appeal, indeed, by the vast majority of the nations of the
35. Shaffer and Trachtman ð2011, 34Þ argue that “giv½ing effect to broadly accepted values em-
bodied in other international law” is essential to the legal system’s legitimacy.
Table 2. Necessity Analysis in Adjudication of Article XX of GATT and Article XIV of GATS
A B C D
U.S.—Gasoline ð1996Þ X X
Canada—Periodicals ð1997Þ X X
U.S.—Shrimp I ð1998Þ X X
Korea—Beef ð2000Þ X X
Argentina—Bovine ð2001Þ* X
EC—Asbestos ð2001Þ X X X
U.S.—Shrimp II ð2001Þ X X
EC—Tariff Preferences ð2004Þ X X
Canada—Wheat Exports ð2004Þ X
Dominican Republic—Cigarettes ð2005Þ X X X
EC—Trademarks ð2005Þ* X X
U.S.—Gambling ð2005Þy X X X
Mexico—Soft Drinks ð2006Þ X X
Brazil—Tyres ð2007Þ X X
U.S.—Customs Bond ð2008Þ X
U.S.—Shrimp ðIÞ ð2008Þ X
China—Auto Parts ð2008Þ X X
Colombia—Ports of Entry ð2009Þ* X X
China—Audiovisual Services ð2009Þ X X
Thailand—Cigarettes ð2011Þ X X
China—Raw Materials ð2011Þz X X X
Source.—Data compiled by Alec Stone Sweet and William Moon from panel and AB reports.
Note.—Date indicates the year of the last ruling on the dispute. Key: As a fact bearing on necessity analysis, a panel,
and/or AB references, A refers to “established” practices in an industry or state measures that are less trade restrictive
than the measure under review; B refers to relevant measures of speciﬁc third-party states; C refers to provisions of a
multilateral treaty or the positions taken by an international organization; D refers to the dicta in Korea—Beef on the
importance of state measures that pursue “common interests or values.”
* Panel ruling was not appealed to the AB.
y Litigation of the GATS.
z Panel ruling pending appeal as of January 30, 2012.
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world.” The AB held that the United States could require shrimp harvesters to employ
turtle-excluding devices in nets in the service of protecting animal life under article XX,
while faulting the United States for failing to properly consult with trading partners be-
fore enforcing the rule.
Finally, we note that the dicta in Korea—Beef—stating that the more state measures
are designed to pursue “common interests or values” ðrather than narrow national inter-
estsÞ, the more likely they will be accepted by the AB as necessary to achieve state ob-
jectives under article XX—are now routinely cited and its terms debated throughout the
proceedings.
The techniques the AB uses in necessity analysis enable it to pursue multilateral so-
lutions to what are, formally, dyadic conﬂicts. More generally, WTO judges engage in
fact ﬁnding and analysis that help it to develop trade law in line with its mission ðto
help WTO members reduce protectionismÞ and with the interests of the vast majority
of its members ðto achieve the beneﬁts of trade in the face of domestic interests op-
posed to liberalizationÞ. As Goldstein and Steinberg ð2009, 280–81Þ have it, “As long
as the Appellate Body does not deviate too far from underlying interests in member
countries, they can rule, countries will comply, and liberalization moves forward—al-
beit with a Greek chorus of politicians and the public complaining about judicial ac-
tivism and a loss of sovereignty.”
Comparatively, the WTO-AB engages in majoritarian activism less systematically
than do the ECJ and the ECTHR. As they have evolved, the ECJ and the ECHR have
made it clear that gauging consensus serves the goal of helping Europeans construct a
transnational identity. The fact that members of the WTO-AB recognize no such man-
date, which would be highly controversial among WTO members, may have the effect
of reducing the intensity in which they pursue majoritarian activism. That said, the
WTO-AB could encourage the secretariat and litigating states to provide evidence of
state consensus on practices that are both GATT compliant and relevant to litigation
at hand, without violating its mission.
I I I . CONCLUSION
In adjudicating a steady stream of litigation on state noncompliance cases, the ECJ,
the ECTHR, and the WTO-AB have used their lawmaking powers to complete cru-
cial but incomplete treaty norms and to enhance the effectiveness of the regime’s law
in other ways. At the same time, they have tempered judicial supremacy and sought to
bolster the legitimacy of judicialized governance by pursuing a strategy of majoritarian
activism.
The various techniques associated with majoritarian activism also help them fulﬁll
their ﬁduciary duties. Trustee courts have an obligation to pursue the values placed in
trust by states on the establishment of the regime ðthe duty of loyaltyÞ. The ECJ,
ECTHR, and the AB developed necessity analysis to deal with their most politically
controversial cases, those involving derogation or limitation clauses that defendant states
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invoke to defend measures that would otherwise be illegal. Majoritarian activism builds
into the reason-giving requirement ðthe duty of accountabilityÞ a concern for multilat-
eral solutions enabling judges to make use of dyadic disputes to develop the law for the
regime as a whole. If their decisions are to be based, at least in part, on an assessment of
state preferences and relevant social beliefs and practices as they evolve, then courts must
build capacity to engage in dialogue with the regime’s beneﬁciaries ðthe duty of delib-
erative engagementÞ, which is precisely what has happened.
We conclude with two general points. First, in the EU, the ECHR, and the WTO,
state noncompliance has been the fuel of judicialization. Noncompliance with rulings
on the part of any single state, even a powerful one, will not threaten the system as long
as the three conditions for judicialization ðSec. IÞ continue to be met. It follows that the
notion of state “noncompliance” must cover politics beyond the narrow question of
whether a state chooses to comply with the regime’s law or a judicial ruling. States adapt
to the court’s jurisprudence in myriad ways, including how they tailor litigation strate-
gies. The courts of these three regimes have been remarkably successful at propagating
argumentation frameworks that govern how noncompliance is to be judged. When
states defend positions on the basis of necessity, they legitimize necessity analysis in a
powerful way—through use.
Second, theoretical approaches to the evolution of international organizations that
were dominant two decades ago are incapable of explaining judicialization under condi-
tions of trusteeship.36 Override is, for all practical purposes, off the table, and noncom-
pliance activates rather than paralyzes the legal system. Under trusteeship conditions, a
regime’s legal system can be expected to evolve in ways that cannot be predicted from the
ex ante preferences of states-as-principals or from the preference of states-as-litigants
when they use the system. States, their preferences, and patterns of compliance are all
crucial factors in the judicial politics of these regimes. Indeed, majoritarian activism is
itself constrained by state preferences, but not by noncompliance and the threat of over-
ride.
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